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ABSTRACT 
 Publishers have spent the last decade and a half struggling 
against falling prices for digital goods. The recent antitrust case 
against Apple and the major publishers highlights collusive price 
fixing as a potential method for resisting depreciation. 
This Article examines the myriad ways in which digital 
distribution puts downward pressure on prices, and seeks to 
determine whether or not collusive price fixing would serve as an 
appropriate response to such pressure given the goals of the 
copyright grant. Considering retailer bargaining power, increased 
access to substitutes, the loss of traditional price discrimination 
methods, the effects of vertical integration in digital publishing, 
and the increasing competitiveness of the public domain, I 
conclude that the resultant downward price pressure might in fact 
significantly hamper the commodity distribution of digital goods.  
I remain unconvinced, however, that price fixing is an 
appropriate solution. The copyright grant affords rights holders 
commercial opportunities beyond simple commodity distribution. 
These other methods for commercializing e-goods suggest to me 
that current pricing trends are not indicative of market failure, but 
rather of a changing marketplace. 
INTRODUCTION 
The future of distribution in the entertainment industry is decidedly, 
if not entirely, digital. The MP3 has vanquished the CD;
2
 Netflix has killed 
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Blockbuster;
3
 nobody reads magazines in any form;
4
 and the e-book in all 
its myriad incarnations seems poised to displace increasingly large volumes 
of printed text.
5
 The significance of this shift for the content and 
entertainment industries is difficult to overstate. In the digital world, 
downward pressure on prices is everywhere. For producers of content, the 
reason is easily distilled: Digital availability has made “piracy”6 a 
household activity.
7 
 
The reality is unsurprisingly more complex, although “pirates” play 
a role. Let us assume, on grounds to be expounded later, that there is a 
source beyond piracy responsible for the downward price pressure 
threatening the digital content industry. Let us assume that this cause is 
simply the competitive economy for digital content, where producers are 
free from the shackles of marginal cost and where consumers can easily 
locate providers of substitute goods. That is, access to free or nearly free 
entertainment is not merely the result of free-culture activists and Cory 
Doctorow giving away valuable things without charge. In this view, rapid 
depreciation of cultural commodities is not simply a side effect of the 
activities of idealists and scofflaws, but rather a competitive reality.   
If such depreciation is indeed reality, what can the content industry 
do to preserve itself? Answers to this question take many forms: new 
business models, new remedies for copyright infringement,
8
 and digital 
rights management are all common attempts at solutions. For publishers, the 
answer may have been to collude on prices, using Apple, Inc. as a facilitator 
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for their decision to collectively and simultaneously switch pricing methods 
and tiers. Consolidation and collusive changes to pricing strategy would 
indeed be straightforward remedies for an industry in crisis, though these 
come at the risk of drawing antitrust scrutiny.  
It is my intention to examine whether the cause of saving a 
languishing industry is dire enough to merit some loosening of our antitrust 
rules to permit these alternative, facially anticompetitive solutions to pricing 
trends for digital goods. The lens through which I address my inquiry is the 
case the Justice Department recently brought against Apple, Inc. and several 
global publishers, alleging horizontal price fixing in the e-book market. The 
Apple suit makes for an attractive target for such an examination because it 
has engendered significant and, in my view, somewhat unexpected popular 
pushback to the government’s claims. As I detail more thoroughly below, 
Apple conspired to fix prices with what were then five of the six largest 
publishers in the world, successfully discontinuing Amazon.com, Inc.’s 
practice of selling bestsellers at $9.99 and raising the effective price floor 
for such books to $12.99. I find it odd that there appears to be little popular 
umbrage at a successful attempt to raise book prices, and wish to tease apart 
whether there is substance to this sentiment. 
My exploration begins in Part I by relating the story of the lawsuit 
and the popular backlash it has engendered. In Part II, I outline the relevant 
laws, both in antitrust and in copyright. As antitrust jurisprudence leans 
heavily on economics, I take care to outline the pertinent economic 
attributes and goals of copyright law and how they might change in a digital 
environment. I apply these legal and economic principles to the current e-
books market, examining whether the copyright grant is reasonably 
effectuated despite current downward price trends. Having examined the 
theoretical merits of the position that we should treat markets for digital 
goods differently, I ultimately conclude in Part III that, while competitive 
markets for digital goods may well be an existential threat to ailing 
incumbents in the content industry, any collusive remedy is even worse. 
I. THE APPLE SUIT 
On January 27, 2010, Apple made a pair of groundbreaking 
announcements: First, they introduced their new tablet computer, the iPad. 
Second, they unveiled the newest component of their media sales empire, 
the iBookstore, a digital bookstore tailor-made to launch with the new 
device.
9
 Despite the hype, the iBookstore as a product was conspicuously 
unremarkable, promising digital downloads of e-books to Apple’s newly 
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expanded iOS-based product line in much the same way that third-party 
software already allowed.
10
  
However, before launching, Apple made arrangements with a 
number of publishers to provide content for the iBookstore. “We’ve got five 
of the largest publishers in the world that are supporting us in this and are 
going to have all their books on the store,” was the framing the late Steve 
Jobs announced at the unveiling. While Apple product launches tend toward 
hyperbolic language, this was no exaggeration. Apple’s launch partners 
were Penguin, Hachette, HarperCollins, Simon & Schuster, and 
Macmillan—that is, every major publisher except Random House.11 
The arrangement was startling not because Apple had agreed with 
publishers to sell their books—that much would be commonplace. Instead, 
the Apple deal changed the entire market for e-books in one fell swoop. 
Previously, e-book retailing functioned in much the same way as retailing of 
physical books, where publishers charged wholesale rates to retailers, who 
in turn were free to set retail prices as they saw fit.
12
 Amazon, by far the 
country’s largest e-book retailer, had been using its freedom as a retailer to 
price books aggressively, usually at $9.99—an amount that for some 
bestsellers was below cost.
13
 
Apple’s store functioned very differently. Publishers sold books 
through Apple under an agency model,
14
 whereby Apple would sell e-books 
                                                     
10
 Barnes and Noble’s “Nook,” Amazon’s “Kindle,” and a number of other lesser-
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11
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 Complaint at 9, United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(No. 12 CV 2826). 
13
 Id. 
14
 Interestingly, the agency model itself has its roots in antitrust law. For a very 
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product below a certain price. Compare Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & 
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with Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling 
Dr. Miles). While vertical price restrictions remain subject to some antitrust 
scrutiny, agency relationships had been earlier proven as a workaround to the per se 
rule. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) (“[T]here is 
nothing as a matter of principle, or in the authorities, which requires us to hold that 
genuine contracts of agency like those before us, however comprehensive as a mass 
or whole in their effect, are violations of the Anti-Trust Act.”).  
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on behalf of the publishers who were free to set their own prices subject to 
some constraints. Under Apple’s plan, these prices hewed to certain tiers; 
for hardcover books, this would mean prices of $12.99, $14.99, or $16.99, 
depending on the physical copy’s cover price.15  At the hands-on event 
following the announcement, Walt Mossberg of the Wall Street Journal 
asked the question on everyone’s mind: How would Apple compete? Why 
would consumers pay $14.99 at the iBookstore for the same book that 
Amazon would sell for $9.99? Jobs’s confident reply: “That won’t be the 
case. The price will be the same.”16  
Jobs was not wrong. Apple’s contracts with the publishers included 
a most-favored-nation clause, requiring the publishers to allow Apple to 
provide the lowest price.
17
 In fact, Jobs framed these contractual 
arrangements as assisting the publishers in providing pushback against 
Amazon’s aggressive e-book pricing. As he told his biographer the day after 
the announcement:  
Amazon screwed it up. It paid the wholesale price for some books, but 
started selling them below cost at $9.99. The publishers hated that —
they thought it would trash their ability to sell hardcover books at $28. 
So before Apple even got on the scene, some booksellers were starting 
to withhold books from Amazon. So we told the publishers, “We'll go 
to the agency model, where you set the price, and we get our 30%, and 
yes, the customer pays a little more, but that's what you want anyway.” . 
. . So they went to Amazon and said, “You're going to sign an agency 
contract or we're not going to give you the books.”
18
 
Ultimately, Jobs’ description mirrors almost exactly the actual 
course of events. The deal with Apple facilitated an industry-wide switch 
from the wholesale model to the agency model, and to a new effective price 
floor of $12.99. 
From the perspective of the publishers, the deal was an opportunity 
to strike back at the market dominance of the leading e-book retailer, 
                                                                                                                       
Note that resale price maintenance is likely to be at its most 
anticompetitive where it is done by colluding firms in a concentrated industry, 
effectively as a tool in a horizontal price fixing agreement, as is alleged in the 
Apple case. See Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the 
Absence of Free Riding, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 431, 474 (2009). 
15
 Complaint at 4, United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
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 Ken Auletta, Publish or Perish, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 26, 2010), 
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17
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2012) (No. 12 CV 2826). 
18
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Amazon.
19
 The publishers were furious with its $9.99 price point, and 
allegedly needed to act collectively to force the retailer into accepting a 
higher price. 
Two years later, on April 11, 2012, the Department of Justice filed 
a complaint charging the publishers and Apple with illegal price fixing 
under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
20
 The Justice Department’s allegations, if 
true, are damning: The complaint recounts stories of regular clandestine 
meetings between the publishing executives, without attorneys, to discuss 
their problems with Amazon’s pricing. Furthermore, emails between 
members of the alleged cartel reveal attempts to remain surreptitious, with 
recipients instructed to “double delete” the messages.21 
All of the publisher defendants have since settled with varying 
amounts of protestation.
22
 Apple, however, with its considerably deeper 
pockets, appears committed to seeing the case through to the end. But my 
project is concerned less with the outcome of the case than with the issue it 
frames.
23
 The reaction amongst the commentariat has been overwhelmingly 
sympathetic to the publishers,
24
 who were admittedly in a bind. Amazon 
was devaluing books by pricing them so aggressively and Amazon was 
keeping its competitors out of the market by pricing below cost. Amazon’s 
pricing strategy was threatening American publishing as we know it.
25
 
According to this perspective, the existential threat posed by e-books is 
caused by anticompetitive action and solvable by anticompetitive action. I 
disagree.  
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 See Ken Auletta, Paper Trail, THE NEW YORKER, Jun. 25, 2012, at 36, available 
at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/06/25/120625fa_fact_auletta. 
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22
 See United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
Macmillan was the last to settle, having held out until just four months before trial. 
See Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Macmillan in E-Books Case, 
Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs (Feb. 8, 2013), 
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23
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24
 See, e.g., David Carr, Book Publishing’s Real Nemesis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 
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25
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II. THE LAW AND THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND DIGITAL 
GOODS 
No doubt, there is an existential threat to the American publishing 
industry. But it is caused by competition—and it is much more deeply 
rooted than Amazon’s market share. In this Part, I argue more precisely the 
nature of the threat, and examine whether collusion can or should be the 
remedy. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act very broadly prohibits “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce.”26  While born of a general popular hostility 
to the monopolistic giants of the late nineteenth century, the Act also serves 
to promote certain economic ideals. Perspectives vary as to whether the 
ideal at issue is consumer welfare or economic efficiency more generally, 
but either way, the target is the deadweight loss associated with 
monopoly—the social loss that occurs when monopolists, and cartels 
maximize profits by underproducing and overpricing their goods. How 
precisely this deadweight loss is to be eliminated is not completely clear. 
The statute’s impossible breadth has left the courts to develop the contours 
of the regulation, more or less unimpeded, since the Act’s passage at the 
end of the nineteenth century. In that time, the Supreme Court has given us 
two primary tests with which to judge anticompetitive collusion: the per se 
rule and the rule of reason. 
The per se rule usually operates as succinctly as its name implies—
certain highly suspect behaviors are simply illegal per se under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act. These are behaviors that “because of their pernicious effect 
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed 
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry.”27 While 
the contours of per se antitrust violations have ebbed and flowed, the 
persistent heart of the doctrine is the bar on agreements to fix prices. Under 
the per se rule, the plaintiff need only prove the existence of an agreement 
to fix prices and that prices were actually fixed.
28
 As a result, the price-
fixing inquiry is often largely a factual one into the behavior of the parties, 
eliding the complexities of the rule of reason. Accordingly, these cases 
often hinge on evidence of backroom meetings and discussions between 
competitors.
29
 
                                                     
26
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
27
 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958). 
28
 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). 
29
 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS ch. x.c. ¶ 27, at 98 (Arthur Hugh Jenkins ed., Kennikat Press, Inc. 1968) 
(1776). 
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Where the court does not see a sole-purpose restraint of trade like 
price fixing, it instead considers the case under the rule of reason, pursuant 
to which courts weigh anticompetitive effects against procompetitive 
benefits.
30
 The rule of reason presents a much greater obstacle to would-be 
antitrust plaintiffs, as the “elaborate inquiry”31 it takes to prove a case can 
be quite elaborate indeed. Accordingly, much depends on whether a court 
applies the rule of reason or the per se rule. 
One particular kind of procompetitive justification for treatment 
under the rule of reason has often been repeated and refuted throughout the 
history of antitrust: ruinous competition. These are situations where 
apparently colluding market participants claim that their restraint is 
necessary to prevent an industry from cannibalizing itself in a price war. In 
general, the law does not look kindly on ruinous competition arguments. In 
the leading antitrust case on the subject, Socony-Vacuum Oil, Justice 
Douglas provided U.S. courts’ typical response to such arguments: 
But such defense is typical of the protestations usually made in price-
fixing cases. Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price 
cutting and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible 
justifications for price-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were 
to be appraised here, the reasonableness of prices would necessarily 
become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event the Sherman 
Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy would be supplanted 
by one which is wholly alien to a system of free competition; it would 
not be the charter of freedom which its framers intended.
32
 
But Socony-Vacuum Oil is an old case and, particularly in a post-
Chicago-School world, it is clearly not a completely accurate reflection of 
current law.
33
 There may be enough wiggle room in the law to allow a 
properly framed ruinous competition argument to persuade a court that 
perhaps the rule of reason is a better fit. 
A. Intellectual Property and Ruinous Competition 
While they are still disapproved generally, might ruinous 
competition arguments carry more weight in intellectual property disputes? 
That is, where there exist federally granted intellectual property rights, the 
                                                     
30
 N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5. 
31
 Id. at 5. 
32
 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 220–21. 
33
 See In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“The plaintiffs retreat to the general language in the Socony–Vacuum opinion, an 
opinion 72 years old and showing its age.”) This opinion—plainly written by Judge 
Posner—points to various cases where the Supreme Court has tempered the per se 
rule as evidence for its assertion. 
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government has effectively given its imprimatur to a certain restraint of 
trade—the copyright monopoly—in furtherance of the goals of intellectual 
property. It seems plausible that the law might tolerate other kinds of 
facially anticompetitive behavior that serves to effectuate intellectual 
property rights. Below, I flesh out the argument for applying rule of reason 
analysis to market arrangements like that between Apple and the publishers. 
Among the powers granted to Congress under the Constitution is 
the ability “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”34 The Anglo-American 
copyright tradition that has evolved pursuant to this constitutional grant is 
one that is well recognized as being utilitarian in nature.
35
 Our law operates 
under the belief that the incentives made possible by copyright are useful in 
persuading authors to create original works, thus advancing the “Progress of 
Science.” 
This is to say that intellectual property as such exists in part because 
inventions and original works of authorship have the traits of public goods: 
They are non-rival and non-excludable and thus unlikely to be produced by 
a market economy—supposedly. As such, absent intellectual property 
protections, authors and inventors would find it difficult, if not impossible, 
to reap the financial and attributional rewards of their labor. In such a 
system, rational—that is, wealth-maximizing—creators might therefore 
abstain from producing works at all. Intellectual property is thought to 
incentivize creation by giving creators the legal hook necessary to cordon 
their work off from others. 
The Supreme Court precedent on the interaction between 
intellectual property and antitrust suggests that Congress’s election to enact 
an intellectual property scheme receives some antitrust deference. In BMI v. 
CBS, a price-fixing case where the Court eschewed the per se rule in part 
because of its own unfamiliarity with applying antitrust law to the music 
industry,
36
 Justice White left the door open to intellectual-property-based 
justifications for anticompetitive behavior, though just by a hair. He wrote: 
Although the copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to 
fix prices among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws, 
we would not expect that any market arrangements reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the rights that are granted would be deemed a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act. Otherwise, the commerce 
anticipated by the Copyright Act and protected against restraint by 
                                                     
34
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
35
 See Lewis Hyde, COMMON AS AIR (2010) 51–54. 
36
 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979). 
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the Sherman Act would not exist at all or would exist only as a pale 
reminder of what Congress envisioned.
37
 
Digital publishing is at least as unfamiliar to the courts as were the 
blanket licenses at issue in BMI,
38
 and the stakes are arguably at least as 
high for copyright holders, who—rightly or wrongly—fear that the 
copyright grant is losing its effectiveness. The question, then, is whether the 
status quo ante in digital publishing allows for a reasonably effectuated 
copyright grant. If it does not, and if the proposed restraint of trade might 
tend to effectuate the right, then there is an argument that rule of reason 
analysis might be appropriate. 
It is easy to see some inherent tension between the Copyright Act 
and our antitrust laws, given the colloquialism “copyright monopoly”. The 
flip, pedantic rejoinder to the monopoly complaint is that the colloquial and 
technical definitions of “monopoly” diverge substantially. It is true that a 
copyright holder enjoys the “exclusive right[]” to reproduce and sell their 
copyrighted works.
39
 But a monopoly in a sense that is economically 
problematic requires more: Such a monopolist must possess sufficient 
market power to control prices.
40
 In theory, even with a copyright grant, 
should suitable substitutes exist, the rights holder would hold little market 
power and must price its goods competitively. 
Thus, we are told not to be concerned about the antitrust risks posed 
by intellectual property for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the 
intellectual property right is necessary to create markets in informational 
goods, even if it grants a monopoly. The reduction in competition is 
necessary for rights holders to recoup the substantial overhead incurred in 
creating an original work of authorship. 
Second, we ought not be concerned because the rights granted tend 
not to be broad enough to give their owners the ability to unilaterally raise 
prices.
41
 The extent to which this is true, however, depends on the scope of 
the intellectual property grant—exactly how different must a substitute be in 
                                                     
37
 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
38
 Most likely much more unfamiliar, given the music publishers’ perennial 
involvement with antitrust suits and continued operation under a consent decree. 
See id. at 10. 
39
 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
40
 See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2013 
(2000). It will likely come as no surprise to the reader that I am very sympathetic to 
the deconstruction of the use of “monopoly” in intellectual property contexts that 
Professor Boyle provides in this particular piece. 
41
 See id.; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 219 (2004). 
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order to be allowed?
42
 The cross-elasticity of demand, however, is itself 
restricted by the operation of our copyright laws. That is, with each 
protected level of abstraction beyond literal similarity, the copyright 
monopoly becomes stronger and stronger. The malleability of copyright 
law
43
 in this regard has come to provide an anticompetitive
44
 buffer for 
firms operating in the content industry that, when combined with an 
expanding catalogue of rights and enforcement mechanisms, can make a 
copyright look more and more like a restraint of trade.  
Nevertheless, even the most maximalist view of copyright leaves 
room for imperfect substitutes. Furthermore, copyrighted goods occupy a 
number of different markets in which consumers have different tendencies 
and habits. Consumers of software, of academic texts, of movies, of novels, 
and of television shows might demonstrate varied cross-elasticities of 
demand depending on the good being consumed. Copyrights for academic 
textbooks, for example, might well provide a much greater monopoly than 
do copyrights on paranormal romance novels.
45
  For the purposes of 
keeping this analysis focused on the publishing industry writ large, let us 
assume that the average copyrighted book is somewhere between a textbook 
and a paranormal romance: Demand is relatively price elastic, but the 
imprecise boundaries of the copyright prevent many authors from producing 
substitute goods for any given title. 
                                                     
42
 The answer is that no one can say for certain, ex ante. Judge Hand explains: 
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague. In the case 
of verbal “works” it is well settled that although the “proprietor’s” 
monopoly extends beyond an exact reproduction of the words, there can 
be no copyright in the “ideas” disclosed but only in their “expression.” 
Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone 
beyond copying the “idea,” and has borrowed its “expression.” Decisions 
must therefore inevitably be ad hoc. 
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
See also DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 
(explaining the substantial-similarity standard) (1963). 
43
 See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 19–20 (1997). 
44
 In that the chilling effects that exist in a given copyright’s shadow increase the 
monopoly value of the copyright. 
45
 We can debate this, of course. A textbook, presumably a fact-based work, has 
thinner copyright protection than does a novel, enabling the production of very 
similar substitutes. However, demand for a given textbook will be much more 
inelastic than will demand for most novels: Students must buy the assigned book, 
regardless of the absurd price tag or inferior quality. Having compared the price 
points of textbooks with those of paranormal romances, I am inclined to think that 
inelastic textbook demand, coupled with a paucity of capable authors, creates more 
monopoly power than does a broad and fuzzy copyright grant to creative works. 
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We are comfortable with this limited monopoly—and frequently 
invoke the term monopoly to describe it—in part because we believe it to be 
necessary to create a market for creative works. This is plainly and 
tautologically true: Rights that do not exist cannot be traded, and the ability 
to fence off and trade copyrights seems likely to be a net producer of social 
benefit. Furthermore, even where the copyright monopoly produces 
supracompetitive benefit to the rights holder, in the manner of a true 
monopolist, we ought not be overly concerned, as the possibility of such 
rents is a necessary part of the incentive system we believe fuels our 
society’s creative engine.46 
Whether and to what extent copyright provides a true monopoly is 
only half of the picture. That is, the above discussion of the copyright 
monopoly adequately describes the pre-digital operation of copyright, the 
ideal of how things are meant to function. This theory posits limited rights 
that allow for the recoupment of investment in certain creative goods, and it 
is not overly controversial. Digital economics, however, are quite different, 
and they alter—possibly fatally—the tenuous balance struck by the 
traditional copyright grant. 
B. Is the Copyright Grant Effectuated in the E-books Market? 
For any commodity, increased competition should, in theory, drive 
prices down. In perfect competition—admittedly a hypothetical ideal—price 
should settle at marginal cost, the cost a firm incurs in producing an 
additional unit of a good.
47
 For most digital goods, however, marginal cost 
is so near zero as to effectively be zero.
48
 From this simplified perspective, a 
digital book in a competitive market should be free or near free.
49
 What is 
more, we have readily available empirical evidence of the veracity of this 
supposition: Online today, the going price for many public domain works is 
$0.00.
50
 
                                                     
46
 Indeed, supracompetitive profits should be necessary for copyright to function. 
For non-rivalrous goods, average cost and marginal cost are not expected to 
intersect at any quantity of production—average cost will always exceed marginal 
cost. If the competitive price is the intersection between marginal cost and demand, 
the only profitable configuration is definitionally supracompetitive. See Yoo, supra 
note 41, at 228. 
47
 See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 258–259 (2d ed. 2011). 
48
 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and 
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 274 (2002). 
49
 See id. 
50
 See, e.g., PROJECT GUTENBERG, (Jun. 3, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://www.gutenberg. 
org/. 
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This reality is arguably problematic for the traditional functioning 
of the copyright grant. As detailed above, the ability of a publisher to 
recoup upfront investment in the creation of a creative good is incumbent on 
the extraction of supracompetitive profits, even if for only a short time.
51
 
Below, I outline a number of ways in which digital economics exerts 
downward pressure on the supracompetitive profits of digital goods 
notwithstanding the copyright grant. 
1. Retailer Bargaining Power 
While the marginal cost of a digital good is theoretically near-zero, 
as discussed above, the marginal cost a retailer faces for third-party titles is 
somewhat greater because retail buyers pay the publishers for each unit. In 
order to act profitably—and in order to avoid charges of predatory 
pricing—a retailer of digital goods will have to price at or above its 
wholesale cost, just like any other retailer. 
However, both the retailer and the wholesaler know the marginal 
costs of the goods being traded are essentially zero. A large retailer, holding 
out for a better retail price, can expect the publishers to at least be willing to 
negotiate: The entire sale price of the good is above cost, so publishers will, 
when pressed, be likely to give somewhat. 
This process plainly cannot continue forever. Eventually, publishers 
will reach the point where their wholesale cost is not enough to cover 
average cost—that is, their sunk costs will outweigh possible revenue. Since 
publishing practice has long been to take a loss on many titles,
52
 profits 
might dip below average cost across all titles relatively early. Nevertheless, 
the normal processes of competition between publishers and between 
retailers can be expected to drop the prices of the goods closer to cost, 
perhaps to a point where publishing ceases to be profitable.  
2. Increased Information and Access to Substitutes 
The greater the number of alternative texts that exist for any given 
copyrighted work, the more likely it is that one of them will prove to be an 
acceptable substitute for the good at issue. While there are less likely to be 
available substitutes for goods that are time sensitive,
53
 books written to be 
                                                     
51
 See Yoo, supra note 41, at 228. 
52
 See Arianne Cohen, A Publishing Company, NEW YORK MAGAZINE (June 3, 
2007), http://nymag.com/news/features/2007/profit/32906/ (“‘Many books are 
unprofitable,’ says CEO Peter Olson. Fifteen to twenty best sellers at a time and a 
huge volume of steadily selling older titles support Random House . . . . Every 
week, the country’s biggest trade publisher releases 67 new books, but it’s the 
33,000-book backlist (Ian McEwan’s Atonement, for example) that supplies 80 
percent of its profit.”) 
53
 E.g., Political candidate biographies, current events, etc., etc. 
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entertainment goods are likely not to share this quality. Accordingly, aside 
from path-breakers into new genres,
54
 few entertainment goods can be 
expected to enjoy relief from the heightened competitiveness of the digital 
marketplace. 
And the digital marketplace is absolutely more competitive because 
there are simply more books to choose from. The physical distribution of a 
small press’s wares is limited by the firm’s size, while the physical 
distribution of a self-published author has traditionally been limited by his 
or her vanity.
55
 Near-zero marginal cost changes this. Anybody who can 
write a book can effectively bring it to press for the whole world. 
Popular wisdom teaches us, paradoxically, both to disregard and to 
fear this development. To disregard it, because publishers are a sine qua non 
for quality; anything made without their oversight will necessarily be 
plagued by errors, mistakes, and poor writing. To fear, it because self-
publishing increases search costs for readers—the narcissism of web 
authors creates an impenetrable morass of junk.
56
 Part of this cynical 
perspective may well have some merit. After all, I do not pretend to be able 
to offer any special insight into what distinguishes quality writing or how 
important a world-class publisher is to achieving it.  
But search costs are most definitely diminishing, no matter the 
increase in total volume of available writing. What this means is that the 
practical substitutability of books in the digital world should, ceteris 
paribus, be greater than what we have seen in earlier markets. A reader with 
knowledge of his or her preferences
57
 can take advantage of publicly 
accessible search utilities
58
 to identify works that best satisfy those 
preferences. While works that have the benefit of some marketing might 
suggest themselves more readily, the universe of satisfactory titles is greatly 
expanded simply by virtue of a greater number of accessible works. 
What is more, this process is aided by the sort of algorithmic 
preference matching aggressively employed by digital retailers.
59
 Setting 
                                                     
54
 Paranormal romance gets the spotlight again! 
55
 However, this has also changed with technology. Print-on-demand books do now 
exist. 
56
 See Steven Rosenbaum, Filter or Be Flooded: Publisher as Curator, 
PUBLISHER’S WEEKLY (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-
topic/columns-and-blogs/soapbox/article/46359-filter-or-be-flooded-publisher-as-
curator.html. 
57
 I recognize this might be a substantial assumption. The argument I find most 
compelling for saving local booksellers, record stores, etc. is that sometimes a 
consumer needs help identifying the right book. 
58
 Themselves a product of the low costs of digital information. 
59
 See, e.g., Improve Your Recommendations, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon. 
com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?nodeId=13316081 (last visited Mar. 2013); 
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aside for now the privacy issues inherent in close digital monitoring of 
consumer behavior, there is good reason to believe in the efficacy of such 
systems. The point is not that these systems make consumers aware of new 
goods, it is that they also make consumers aware of competing goods and 
their relative prices. Where demand is elastic, it stands to reason that 
consumers faced with two very different prices for two very similar goods 
would switch to the low-cost version, regardless of its possibly humble 
provenance. 
3. Vertical Integration 
The biggest threat that e-book retailers pose—the biggest threat that 
digital goods pose—to traditional publishing is that of a vertically 
integrated firm that is not a part of the cartel. Although it was not happy 
with the prices Amazon charged for its books, the industry was able to set 
some sort of a floor: Amazon was limited by the wholesale price it was 
made to pay to the publishers, which, in the absence of other costs, would 
act as Amazon’s marginal cost. 
A vertically integrated firm would be able to sell closer to the true 
marginal cost of digital goods, provided that it has not promised its 
competitors to keep prices high.  The wholesaler/retailer relationship has 
acted as a buffer, however temporary, to the realities of decreasing costs. A 
vertically integrated firm dealing in enough volume, committed to 
competing on price, would effectively remove that buffer. Theoretically, 
competing on price would be business suicide: The new entrant would be 
unable to cover its average cost if it maintains the same cost structure 
adopted by incumbents. A leaner publisher, however, or a facilitator of self-
publishing, could do a great deal to undermine the competitiveness of 
industry incumbents without itself collapsing. 
4. Loss of Price Discrimination Methods 
The stakes are raised for the publishers because physical books and 
e-books are relatively good substitutes
60
 with drastically different 
economics of production. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the alleged 
cartel in the Apple case was particularly afraid of low-priced e-books 
cannibalizing sales of hardcover editions.
61
 
                                                                                                                       
see also Matt Marshall, Aggregate Knowledge raises $5M from Kleiner, on a roll, 
VENTURE BEAT (Dec. 10, 2006), http://venturebeat.com/2006/12/10/aggregate-
knowledge-raises-5m-from-kleiner-on-a-roll/ (describing new entrant in 
recommendation field). 
60
 Indeed, for some consumers they may be perfect substitutes. For others, the 
lower-priced e-book might even be more desirable than a physical book. 
61
 Complaint at 14, United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No. 12 CV 2826). 
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This fear is not unfounded. The greater the difference between the 
price of the e-book and the hardcover, the more theoretically likely it is that 
a potential buyer will opt for the electronic version. This matters to 
publishers because it partially disables one of the more effective means of 
garnering supracompetitive profits: price discrimination. 
Price discrimination is the practice of pricing along the demand 
curve, charging each customer the maximum that he or she would be 
willing to pay. Perfect price discrimination is an efficient economic 
situation: There is no deadweight loss because all possible surplus goes to 
the producer. Perfect price discrimination is not attainable, but price 
discrimination nonetheless tends to be effective in garnering the 
supracompetitive profits necessary to stay afloat in intellectual property-
based industries. For books, the traditional mechanism has been windowed 
release, where books first come out as hardcovers with large cover prices 
meant to target the least price-sensitive buyers and lower-cost paperbacks 
follow.
62
 
Digital availability has been merciless to such methods of price 
discrimination. While e-book prices still trend somewhat higher for new 
releases, the difference is not terribly significant. And, what is more, many 
of those consumers who would have paid $30 for a hardcover are now 
paying $10 for an e-book. A substantial portion of the lost $20 comes out of 
the producer’s surplus—a boon for the readers, but a huge problem for the 
bottom line of an industry that depends on supracompetitive profit. Why not 
simply delay the release of the digital version? Of course, some publishers 
have done exactly that.
63
 But this solution is at best a stopgap and comes 
with a great deal of danger—on the internet, release delays fuel piracy, at 
least anecdotally, and piracy is plainly a worse result than taking a cut in 
profit margins.
64
 
5. The Public Domain 
                                                     
62
 See Cory Doctorow, With a Little Help: The Price is Right, PUBLISHER’S 
WEEKLY (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/columns-
and-blogs/cory-doctorow/article/42071-with-a-little-help-the-price-is-right.html. 
63
 See Motoko Rich, Publishers Delay E-Book Releases, N.Y. TIMES ARTS BEAT 
(Dec. 9, 2009, 4:12 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/publishers-
delay-e-book-releases/. 
64
 See Ryan Lawler, How Hollywood Drives People to Piracy, GIGAOM (Jan. 19, 
2012, 1:27 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/01/19/hollywood-windows-piracy/. There 
is a clear trend, at least in the film industry, to reduce windowing delays somewhat 
in an effort to stave off such piracy. See Lauren A.E. Schuker & Ethan Smith, 
Hollywood Eyes Shortcut to TV, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704167704575258761968531140.
html. 
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As demonstrated above, near-zero marginal cost is enough on its 
own to undermine the copyright monopoly. But, with the passage of enough 
time, the damage is made even worse. As goods age and fall out of 
copyright,
65
 they become zero-cost competition to copyrighted works. This 
is as it should be, and it has a nice symmetry as well—the public domain is 
the creative wellspring for all creative works, but works within the public 
domain are also independent competitors for consumption. 
It is hard to gauge how much the wide availability of public domain 
works affects prices. Intuitively, it does not seem to have that great of an 
effect. That the public domain does not exert more price pressure on 
copyrighted works can mean either or both of two things: First, popular 
taste does not much demand older works,
66
 or second, the volume of works 
safely
67
 ensconced in the public domain might be too meager to satisfy 
demand. I think the latter more likely—many works that are more than 95 
years old still compete admirably.  It is the paucity of available works that 
restricts their market effects, not the appeal of said works.  
The future of the public domain is blindingly bright compared to its 
present, assuming, as always, that works will ever again fall into the public 
domain.
68
 Many of the cultural goods we produce today are simply too new 
to be found in the public domain. Recorded sound is a nineteenth century 
invention, and recording quality pre-microphone is so atrocious—and 
degradation of the recordings so bad—that most consumers would not listen 
to many public domain recordings for pleasure. Much the same can be said 
about early moving pictures.
69
 Novels are not so technologically limited, but 
they are also not so terribly old in their modern form. Besides, in times 
before ubiquitous literacy and availability of writing materials, fewer novels 
were produced. But our digital goods do not degrade, and we are producing 
more creative goods than ever before. Moreover, I am inclined to believe 
that the quality—as in, fidelity—of our digital media is high enough to 
render them accessible to future generations. All this to say that though the 
                                                     
65
 If they ever do. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
66
 And indeed, most works that enter the public domain “naturally” have to be quite 
old—only works published before 1923 are sure to qualify. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 
(2006); see also Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the 
United States, CORNELL UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT INFORMATION CENTER (Jan. 3, 
2013), http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm. 
67
 Or perhaps not so safely. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
68
 See generally Jennifer Jenkins, In Ambiguous Battle: The Promise (And Pathos) 
of Public Domain Day, 2014, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2013) (lamenting the 
impoverishment of the public domain and charting alternative zones of legal 
freedom). 
69
 But see THE CABINET OF DR. CALIGARI (Goldwyn Distrib. Co. 1920) available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrg73BUxJLI. 
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public domain is not necessarily a competitive threat to the content industry 
today, it may well be in time. 
C. The Amazon Monopsony: Unimportant to Price Trends 
As has been shown above, there is no doubt that there is significant 
price pressure on the publishing industry. The refrain from the press and 
from the publishers has been that this pressure is the result of Amazon’s 
monopsony: Amazon has long been the only major player in the American 
e-book business, and its status as the largest buyer gives it the bargaining 
power to extract deals capable of wringing the publishers dry. It is easy 
enough to be sympathetic to this position: For each of the possible threats I 
have enumerated above, all except for piracy can be attributed to Amazon. 
Amazon prices aggressively, helps consumers identify substitute goods, is 
vertically integrating as a publisher, and is facilitating self-publishing. 
Amazon also distributes many public domain works free of charge. But 
these are all qualities of a highly competitive business, not an 
anticompetitive one. 
The allegations of anticompetitiveness on Amazon’s part are—at 
least as far as the public is in a position to know
70—misplaced. 
Unfortunately, teasing apart these allegations completely requires dealing 
with another section of the Sherman Act and is outside the scope of this 
Essay. Suffice to say that § 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits unilaterally 
anticompetitive behavior, that is, monopolization.
71
 A requirement for a 
violation of § 2 is market power, the power to increase prices. Market 
power correlates poorly with market share when considering digital goods. 
Monopolists extract their rents by reducing output and increasing prices. 
The producer of a digital good, however, will struggle to reduce output even 
with a very dominant position: Relying on the absence of marginal cost, 
competing firms can increase production of substitute goods to compensate 
for the would-be monopolistic strategy.
72
 The publishers do have a price 
problem, and Amazon is contributing to that problem, but Amazon’s 
contributions are not sanctionable.  They are merely what digital 
competition looks like. 
D.  Would a Restraint of Trade Countermand the Perceived Failings 
in Copyright for E-books? 
                                                     
70
 Amazon, like many businesses, keeps many important details out of their 
publicly released reports. In order to know with any certainty whether or not 
Amazon’s e-books operations have done anything suspect, one would need access 
to some of the more closely held records. 
71
 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
72
 See McKenzie & Lee, supra note 64, at 261. 
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In formulating his brief thoughts on the merits of the Justice 
Department’s case against Apple,73 Richard Epstein spells out the basic 
form of the intellectual property justification for the alleged collusion, 
writing: 
[I]t is not clear that lower prices are necessarily in the long term 
interests of the public at large.  As with all complex transactions, lower 
prices spell both low costs to consumers and low royalties to authors.  
The lower royalties translate into lower level of production of new 
books, so that we do not have here the usual cartel situation where 
higher prices reduce output.  It is plausible that the higher royalties 
increase the number of titles available, and by increasing competition 
in the new book market, prices are lowered in the long run.
74
  
At its core, this plays to the classic utilitarian argument for 
intellectual property, that is, that the creative impulses of authors and 
inventors are sensitive to incentives, and maintaining those incentives is a 
social good. 
 The concern can be presented in several different ways. We might 
be concerned merely about participation in the market. A priori, we have 
economic reason to believe that there will be little to no market for 
copyrighted goods without a reasonable possibility of supracompetitive 
profit, ergo collusive steps to retain monopoly-like rents are necessary to 
effectuate the copyright grant.  
It can also be argued that any diminution of publishers’ 
supracompetitive profits comes with a great social cost that copyright was 
meant to foreclose, whether or not wide participation in creative enterprise 
is empirically affected. Publishers, in the attempt to compete in the cutthroat 
e-book market, will eventually have to cut into their fixed costs (after all, 
there are no marginal costs to cut!) And those fixed costs (the argument 
goes) are what, historically, have provided quality in publishing and success 
for authors: screening, editing, marketing, etc.  
I am skeptical of these arguments. Content as a profitable enterprise 
served us well—well enough that the concept of the copyright grant seems 
sound in principle. But, the publishers seek to ensure that their copyrights 
guarantee a commodity market in their wares. I do not mean commodity in 
the sense of an undifferentiated good—much of this paper has been 
dedicated to how copyrighted works can be differentiated—but rather in the 
sense of a good exchanged on the market. Above I demonstrate how falling 
prices suggest that commodity distribution might very well cease to be an 
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 Hint: Professor Epstein does not think the case has merit. 
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 Richard Epstein, Not Proven: The DOJ Suit against Apple for eBook Pricing, 
RICOCHET (Apr. 11, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Not-Proven-
The-DOJ-suit-Against-Apple-for-eBook-Pricing. 
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effective means of producing and selling copyrighted works. But this does 
not meant that the copyright grant is necessarily ineffective—there are other 
methods of distribution for which copyright remains an important, if not 
necessary, tool. 
Furthermore, even accepting the argument that some fix to pricing 
is necessary, horizontal agreement as a solution poses its own problems. 
First and foremost, price fixing exacerbates the piracy problem, rather than 
solving it. By underproducing and overcharging, the cartel only makes 
infringing uses more attractive. A broad enough cartel—ASCAP or BMI, 
for instance—might have enough market power to survive competition from 
close substitutes, but it would do nothing about piracy. In this way, piracy 
provides one of the best reasons to distrust justifications of would-be 
cartels. In order for the cartel to form and operate effectively, we would 
need to strengthen our copyright enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the 
monopoly rents are actually achieved. There is already a great deal of 
literature on why ever-increasing rights holder control is undesirable,
75
 so I 
do not believe it is necessary to elaborate overmuch on why this is 
problematic. Suffice to say that once our collective freedoms become 
implicated in the enforcement of a government granted property right, we 
ought to think twice about the necessity or scope of the right.  
CONCLUSION 
 Antitrust law and policy can, as I have shown, be critical in the 
shaping of the information economy. This should be nothing new—we are 
used to the content industry pleading for effective monopolies. James Boyle 
has elsewhere shown how the content-industry lobby has, while disclaiming 
the “monopoly” characterization of intellectual property, subtly adopted 
monopolistic trappings in seeking greater enforcement powers.
76
 I have 
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 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 82 (2008). 
76
 For instance, the refrain among today’s copyright maximalists is that, 
substantially for the reasons stated above, “cost-based” pricing is no longer feasible 
for digital goods; we should turn to “value-based” pricing instead. See, e.g., Kent 
Anderson, Not Free, Not Easy, Not Trivial—The Warehousing and Delivery of 
Digital Goods, THE SCHOLARLY KITCHEN (Jun. 13, 2012), http://scholarlykitchen. 
sspnet.org/2012/06/13/not-free-not-easy-not-trivial-the-warehousing-and-delivery-
of-digital-goods/ (“[T]he information economy works more rationally if it’s value-
based.”).  
Value-based pricing refers to the value to the consumer—that is, pricing 
pegged as closely to possible to a good’s demand curve. In other words, price 
discrimination. In Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?, James Boyle laid bare this particular 
duplicative use of “monopoly” by the content industry lobby. First, intellectual 
property apologists would disavow the existence of the kind of monopoly that is 
meant to invite antitrust scrutiny. Then they would adopt the language of 
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shown here another, more brazen iteration of a similar sleight of hand: one 
in which copyright holders, disavowing as ever any monopoly, seek to price 
like monopolists by way of antitrust’s cardinal sin, a horizontal agreement 
to fix prices. 
In a world where economic efficiency is paramount,
77
 we might be 
tempted by these rationales even if their result is behavior we are normally 
inclined to disdain. In response, I would point to the dissent in Leegin, 
which cautions against over-reliance on economics scholarship in the 
production of antitrust law, pointing out that per se rules have 
administrative certainty and clarity.
78
 We do know that prices for books are 
under pressure and are falling. We can reasonably suspect that the future 
will hold more of the same, and this might persuade us to abandon our hard 
and fast rules. But it is what we do not know—how other means of 
monetization might successfully flourish in the absence of commodity 
pricing—that should give us pause.  
None of this means that copyright as it has existed—without 
brazenly anticompetitive assistance—has no value in the digital age. 
Intellectual property can still be a valuable incentive for creation even if it 
does not precisely guarantee the ability to commodify one’s work. No doubt 
there will be some people so distressed by the idea that they might choose 
not to publish at all, but we must assume that these will be a minority, 
driven as much by a generational fissure in social practice as by the intrinsic 
morality of copyright. 
 A decommodified cultural economy should be as exciting as it is, 
rightly, terrifying. But we are testing the waters now through offerings like 
Netflix, the Kindle owner’s lending library, and Spotify. These are all for-
profit, service-based providers of content, increasingly central to cultural 
consumption and yet it does not appear that the sky is falling. 
Anticompetitive collusion, which basic antitrust principles teach us as being 
                                                                                                                       
monopolistic price discrimination in seeking greater enforcement powers. Boyle, 
supra note 40, at 2028. 
77
 For example, James Boyle’s “Econo-World.” See Boyle, surpa note 40, at 2011. 
78
 “Economic discussion, such as the studies the Court relies upon, can help provide 
answers to these questions, and in doing so, economics can, and should, inform 
antitrust law. But antitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate 
economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views. That is because law, unlike economics, 
is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon the content of rules 
and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by 
lawyers advising their clients. And that fact means that courts will often bring their 
own administrative judgment to bear, sometimes applying rules of per se 
unlawfulness to business practices even when those practices sometimes produce 
benefits.” Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 914 (2007) 
(Breyer, J. dissenting). 
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harmful to insofar as it seeks to preserve a business model that we are not 
certain we need to effectuate copyright, is not merited. 
 
